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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Provisions regarding closer cooperation between EU Member States appeared 
for the first time in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Three years later these 
provisions were augmented and restated, by means of the Treaty of Nice, now 
using the term enhanced cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty has –again- made 
some –minor- changes to the conditions under which Member States can 
engage in enhanced cooperation. 
Put briefly, as Articles 20 and 326-334 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) state, enhanced cooperation is regarded as a measure 
of last resort and applicable only if the Council establishes that certain 
objectives cannot be obtained within a reasonable period of time by the Union 
as a whole. At least nine Member States have to participate in the enhanced 
cooperation which can only deal with policies within the framework of the 
Union‟s non-exclusive competences. The enhanced cooperation is open to all 
Member States at any time. Acts adopted within the framework of enhanced 
cooperation do not become part of the general accession acquis. 
Up till recently, the possibility for closer or enhanced cooperation had not 
been used, even though more informal ways of flexible integration have been 
used in abundance (Groenendijk 2007). Recently however, in two specific 
policy fields enhanced cooperation has been put forward as a feasible option. 
In the field of patents eleven Member States will go ahead to implement a 
single patent, leaving Member States like Spain and Italy behind. In the field 
of divorce law, enhanced cooperation has been established by fourteen 
Member States, in June 2010. 
This chapter analyses the pros and cons of the use of enhanced cooperation 
under the Lisbon Treaty, both in a general way and by looking specifically at 
these two cases. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the concept of 
flexible integration and the various forms it can take, with an emphasis on 
alternative integration and differentiated integration. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the procedural and substantive requirements to use the enhanced 
cooperation mechanism. Section 4 deals with the pros and cons of enhanced 
cooperation as compared to unitary integration and alternative integration. 
Section 5 focuses on the two current cases of actual enhanced cooperation 
(patents and divorce law). Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION 
 
 
2.1 Types of flexible integration1 
Flexible integration (or: sub-integration) refers to an instance of integration 
that takes place among some but not all members of an already existing 
(larger) integration scheme (in casu the European Union). It can take 
different shapes. The first typical feature is whether flexible integration takes 
place within the EU institutional and decision-making framework or not. The 
second typical feature refers to the policies involved. Flexible integration can 
                                                        
1 See Groenendijk (2007) for a more elaborate discussion. 
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deal with policies that are within the EU policy domain (as marked out by the 
relevant EU Treaties) or outside the EU policy domain. 
If flexible integration uses another institutional framework than the EU 
framework it can either be labelled new integration or alternative integration.2 
New integration refers to flexible integration outside the EU institutional 
framework dealing with policy areas that are not part of the EU policy domain. 
Integration outside the EU institutional framework, concerned with policy 
areas that are within the EU domain, is called alternative integration. In 
both cases, because the EU institutional framework is not used, it is possible 
to cooperate with EU Member States as well as with outsiders (third 
countries). 
If flexible integration occurs within the EU institutional framework, there are 
again two possibilities. One may call odd integration flexible integration that 
employs EU institutions but deals with policies outside the EU domain. The 
term differentiated integration concerns flexible integration taking place 
both within the institutional framework and within the policy domain of the 
EU. Table 1 shows the four basic types of flexible integration. 
 
Table 1: Four basic types of flexible integration 
 Use of EU framework Use of alternative 
framework 
Policies within EU 
domain 
Differentiated integration (including 
enhanced cooperation) 
Alternative 
integration 
Policies outside EU 
domain 
Odd integration New integration 
 
In the literature a large variety of concepts and terms has been put forward to 
denote certain types of “flexibility”: inter se agreements, partial agreements, 
parallel procedures, two-speed Europe, multi-speed Europe, multi-speed 
integration, European vanguard, avant-garde group, directoire, pioneers‟ 
clubs, pioneers and followers, core Europe, Kern Europas, Harter Kern, noyau 
dur, centre de gravité, centre of gravitation, variable geometry, géometrie 
variable, Europe à la carte, pick-and-choose, differentiated Europe, 
Abgestufte Integration, two-tier Europe, multi-tier Europe, plusiers niveaux, 
concentric circles, cercles concentriques, magnetic fields, hub-and-spoke-
Europe, eccentric ellipses, opt-in arrangements, opt-out arrangements, 
constructive abstention, declaratory abstention, positive abstention, active 
abstention, transition periods, special treatments, derogations, exemptions, 
flying geese, breakaway riders and pelotons.3 
In the remainder of this section we will try to make some sense of these 
different concepts and terms, by focusing on two types of flexible integration: 
alternative integration and differentiated integration. 
 
 
2.2 Alternative integration 
Europe is galore with integration outside the EU framework. After all, EU 
Membership does not imply that countries have given up all other treaty-
                                                        
2 The distinction between the four types of (sub-)integration is based on but different 
from Su (2007), who uses the terms opt-out integration (rather than alternative 
integration) and alienated integration (rather than odd integration). 
3 See inter alia Wallace & Wallace (1995), Lansdaal (2002), and Federal Trust (2005) 
for overviews of concepts of flexibility. 
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making authority, which is exercised in relation with third countries or fellow 
Member States. Such agreements are called inter se agreements, partial 
agreements, or parallel procedures. Some examples of alternative 
integration are: the Benelux cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg; the monetary union between Belgium and Luxembourg 
(now incorporated into the EMU); the Nordic cooperation between Denmark, 
Norway, Finland and Sweden, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland; the 
Schengen cooperation based on an Agreement signed in 1985 (part of the EU 
framework since the Treaty of Amsterdam); the Common Travel Area 
between the UK and Ireland; the Bologna Process dealing with higher 
education which now involves 47 European countries; the European Patent 
Organisation; the cooperation within the framework of NATO and the Western 
European Union (WEU); the cooperation within the OECD, and various other 
bilateral or multilateral treaties on a multitude of issues.  
In some of these cases (for example the Benelux and the Nordic cooperation) 
the term alternative integration as a form of flexible integration may be 
misleading, because the “alternative” cooperation was already there before 
the larger integration within the EU framework came about (Benelux: 1944; 
Nordic cooperation: 1952). The EEC Treaty specifically did not put an end to 
existing bilateral or multilateral treaties, a line which has been held on to with 
the various accession treaties. 
Besides, some of these forms of cooperation do not so much or exclusively 
deal with specific policy areas (functional cooperation) but have developed 
into forms of structured coordination of views in order to maximize influence 
on collective decision-making within the EU. Again, the Benelux is an example 
of such a structured coordination, as is the Nordic cooperation. 
 
Interestingly, it appears that alternative integration has more than one 
potential advantage. First, with parallel agreements it is possible to cover a 
larger part of Europe than just the EU-27 (or before 2004: the EU-15), with 
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland as the “usual suspects” when 
it comes to cooperation with third countries. 
Secondly, alternative integration may be beneficial because the EU framework 
imposes various constraints (in terms of decision-making, legislation, 
democratic accountability et cetera). This should especially explain instances 
of alternative integration involving all EU Member States. 
Thirdly, in cases where only but not all EU Member States are involved, inter 
se agreements may be seen as a form of de facto enhanced cooperation 
between a relatively small subset of Member States, but without using the EU 
enhanced cooperation mechanism. Lack of consensus in a specific policy field, 
or perceived differences in implementation capacity and speed, is at the root 
of this kind of alternative integration. As the Schengen and Bologna cases 
show, such alternative integration by a vanguard group can easily become a 
catalyst for all EU Members, eventually spilling-over to the entire EU. 
Alternative integration can thus be used as leverage to speed up EU 
integration in a specific area. 
The main disadvantage of alternative integration is of course that the EU 
institutional and legal framework is not used, resulting in a relatively high 
level of transaction costs, both in terms of preparation and negotiation of a 
multitude of bilateral agreements as in terms of enforcement and uniform 
application. 
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The success of alternative integration can be seen in two different lights. On 
the one hand, manifold alternative integration to a certain extent is the result 
of failure of integration within the EU framework. If Member States cannot 
satisfactorily deal with policy problems inside the EU, they will start looking 
for alternative arrangements. On the other hand, alternative integration is 
sometimes perceived as a threat to the larger EU integration, and various 
possibilities for differentiated integration (i.e. flexibility within the EU 
institutional framework) have developed - especially since the Treaty of 
Maastricht- as an alternative to “alternative” integration. 
 
 
2.3 Differentiated integration 
The starting point to discuss differentiated integration is the EU default mode 
of integration, which involves uniformity in time and matter, and which can be 
called monolithic integration or unitary integration. With unitary integration 
common EU wide goals are set and are to be reached at a certain unique point 
in time by all Member States. 
Departure from this default mode is possible along a number of dimensions: 
1. Differentiation can refer to time only as opposed to differentiation in time 
and matter. Put differently: to what extent should sub-integration 
eventually be an exclusive thing? If there is differentiation in time only, 
common EU-wide goals are retained but may be reached at different points 
in time by different Member States. Sub-integration in this sense is open 
to all, and indeed is successful only if eventually all members of the larger 
integration participate (after which the sub-integration is simply absorbed 
into that larger integration). If there is differentiation in time and matter, 
aiming at and attaining certain policy goals will be exclusive to the 
„insiders‟; 
2. Sub-integration may deal either with a single issue (or a few single, non-
related issues) or with a multitude of (potentially interrelated) policy 
issues; 
3. Sub-integration can differ as far as the size of the group of insiders is 
concerned (relative to the size of the group of outsiders); 
4. The composition of the group of insiders can be steady across the range of 
policy areas in which sub-integration occurs, but can also vary (mixed 
coalitions); 
5. Moreover, such coalitions can be more or less stable over time; 
6. There can be a difference in influence in issues of the larger integration 
between those Member States inside and those Member States outside the 
sub-integration. 
 
The closest thing to the default mode, i.e. unitary integration, is 
differentiation in time only, on a limited number of issues, and involving a 
limited number of outsiders. Transitional arrangements, temporary 
derogations and/or exemptions (to the acquis communautaire) are a clear 
example of this kind of flexibility. Such differentiation has always been part of 
the Treaties (and of numerous Protocols) and of specific Community 
Directives. Constructive abstention (declaratory abstention, positive 
abstention, active abstention) is yet another possibility, earlier restricted 
by the Treaty to specific measures taken as part of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, but now (under the Lisbon Treaty) expanded to (European) 
Council decision-making under the unanimity rule (Articles 235 and 238 
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TFEU). With constructive abstention a Member State can simply declare that it 
does not support the decision taken and will not apply it itself, but accepts 
that the decision commits the Union. Constructive abstention to a large extent 
resembles the more general idea of a (temporary and single-issue) opt-out 
clause, as for instance used by the United Kingdom and Denmark to be left 
out of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).4  
If a larger number of Member States opt-out, but these outsiders are still 
expected to catch up with the others at a later stage, such sub-integration 
can be labelled multi-speed Europe (two-speed Europe, multi-speed 
integration). Here the idea is that European integration is driven forward by 
a sub-group of Member States, but no Member State is excluded in the long 
run nor can Member States exclude themselves everlastingly. Differentiation 
is allowed to exist temporarily only. A special case of multi-speed is what 
German commentators call abgestufte Integration. Member States agree 
on particular policy objectives, but specific timetables or stages of adoption by 
individual Member States are set. Differentiation is then a matter of (timing 
of) policy implementation rather than policy goals. 
The multi-speed concept is rather similar to the idea of a European 
vanguard group (avant-garde group, directoire, pioneers’ clubs, 
pioneers and followers, pathfinders, breakaway riders). Again, the final 
goal is to reach shared objectives, with the vanguard group braking ground 
and shaping these objectives along the way. 
 
Other forms of differentiated integration presuppose that differentiation is not 
necessarily temporary. The idea of a core Europe (Kern Europas, Harter 
Kern, noyau dur) assumes a highly restricted membership of that core, 
which is (potentially) permanently limited. The core countries get engaged in 
far deeper integration than Member States outside the core. The latter do not 
longer constrain the former. The deeper integration does involve multiple 
related issues, and core countries do have a considerably larger overall 
influence than countries outside the core. The idea of a two-tier Europe is 
essentially the same, but uses another kind of visualization.5 The related ideas 
of concentric circles (cercles concentriques) and of multi-tier Europe 
(Europe de plusiers niveaux) differ in that they presuppose the existence 
of more than just two groups (of insiders and outsiders). 
Variable geometry (géometrie variable) is yet another concept of sub-
integration. It also assumes a permanent state of sub-integration to be 
established, due to the fact that integrative capacities and desires will vary 
across the Union. Variable geometry envisages a series of different policy 
areas (on top of the internal market), all of which would have varying 
membership (or: policy consortia).6 Contrary to the idea of a hard core, which 
puts a permanent set of Member States in the middle of integration, variable 
geometry starts from the internal market as core policy, around which various 
other policies have developed and will develop. This policy area configuration 
                                                        
4 In the EU opt-out clauses are generally reserved for incumbent members. 
Candidate states are not being offered the opportunity to negotiate similar flexible 
arrangements; the European Council has made it clear on a number of occasions that 
acceding members will not be allowed opt-outs or others forms of flexible integration. 
5 The same goes for concepts like magnetic fields, centre of gravitation, and hub-
and-spoke Europe. 
6 The concept of eccentric ellipses (Gomes de Andrade 2005) is one way of visualizing 
this variable geometry. 
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and the membership of the different policy consortia are however rather 
stable. The latter is not necessarily the case with Europe à la carte (or: 
pick-and-choose, or: opt in/opt out). Moreover, the policy core here is not 
a full-fledged internal market but a common trading zone. 
 
The differences between the various forms of differentiated integration are 
gradual only, and it is hard to unambiguously label actual examples of 
differentiated integration. EMU, for example, can be regarded as an example 
of two-speed Europe but it also resembles a vanguard group, it involves opt-
outs, and it can also be concerned with the current and future EU core. 
However, the different types of flexibility are linked to certain views on how 
European integration should proceed, and in some cases can be linked to 
specific Member States. The idea of a Europe à la carte can be regarded as a 
mechanism to break federalist dynamism (Philippart & Sie Dhian Ho 2003, p. 
5) and has been put forward in 1994 by then UK Prime Minister John Mayor.7 
Ideas like the noyeau dur, géometrie variable, and cercles concentriques have 
been advocated by French politicians (Delors, Mitterand, Balladur), assuming 
a Franco-German coalition at the heart and at the helm of Europe.8 
Interestingly, differentiated integration can be advocated from a position that 
favours deeper integration as well as from a position that aims at curbing 
federalist tendencies. 
 
How do all these variants of flexibility relate to the formal mechanism of 
enhanced cooperation? As Su (2005) observes, the need to seriously discuss 
differentiated integration became imminent due to the eastern enlargement of 
the EU. In his analysis (partly building on Philippart & Sie Dhian Ho 2003), 
enlargement has been postponed time and time again, in order for the EU to 
reach consensus on mechanisms it could use to deal with diversity, which 
explains the emergence of opt-outs, the increased importance of subsidiarity, 
the embracing in 2000 of the open method of policy coordination, and –last 
but not least- of enhanced cooperation. When it became clear, quite early in 
the process, that the central and eastern European countries would not 
content themselves with association agreements but wanted full EU 
Membership, and EU leaders –pressured by Germany- had to give 
enlargement the green light (in Copenhagen, June 1993), a new and formal 
mechanism had to be found to make differentiation between EU Members 
possible: “closer cooperation” or “enhanced cooperation”, to which we now 
turn. 
 
 
3. PROVISIONS FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION 
 
 
Enhanced cooperation can be seen as a specific mode of flexible integration, 
with a particular legal basis which regulates (and constraints) it. Provisions 
regarding “closer cooperation” appear for the first time in the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam and were changed (now using the term “enhanced cooperation”) 
by means of the Treaty of Nice (which became effective on February 1, 2003). 
                                                        
7 In his William and Mary Lecture given in Leyden in June 1994. 
8 See Lansdaal (2002) for a more detailed discussion of joint Franco-German ideas in 
this field. 
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In the still-born Constitutional Treaty the Nice mechanism was subjected to 
further changes; the provisions on enhanced cooperation in the Constitutional 
Treaty were later fully incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The closer cooperation mechanism of the Treaty of Amsterdam was a very 
cautious and rather general mechanism allowing a group of willing states to 
undertake closer cooperation among themselves while using the institutional 
mechanisms of the EU, but only if others would allow them to do so (De Witte 
2004, p. 145). This mechanism was established in the first and third pillars, 
and contained an emergency brake procedure: the Council of Ministers had to 
decide on closer cooperation by qualified majority, but any Member State, for 
important and stated reasons of national policy, could refer the proposal to 
the European Council for a unanimous decision (thereby constituting a de 
facto veto right). Furthermore, closer cooperation had to be endorsed by a 
majority of Member States (smaller groups were not allowed). 
 
The Nice Treaty did away with the emergency brake procedure (in the first 
and third pillar) and extended enhanced cooperation to the second pillar 
(CFSP) albeit with an emergency brake (i.e. de facto veto) procedure. In the 
first and second pillar proposals for enhanced cooperation (put to the Council 
by the European Commission following a request from the Member States 
involved) were subject to a qualified majority vote. The number of Member 
States required for launching the procedure was changed from the majority to 
a fixed number of eight Member States. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty stripped the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism of some of the conditions mentioned in the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties (which were largely considered to be 
superfluous anyway; see Philippart 2003a, 2003b), but most provisions were 
retained, albeit rephrased. Following but amending Philippart (2003b) we can 
distinguish between substantial, procedural and decision-making/operational 
provisions. 
First, under the Lisbon Treaty, the substantial provisions for enhanced 
cooperation9 are the following: 
a. provisions that specify what enhanced cooperation should aim at. 
Enhanced cooperation is meant to aim at furthering the objectives of the 
Union, at protecting and serving EU interests, and at reinforcing the 
process of European integration. Still, enhanced cooperation is a last resort 
(i.e. it has to be established within the Council that the objectives of such 
cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as 
a whole); 
b. provisions referring to what enhanced cooperation should not entail. 
Enhanced cooperation must not undermine the internal market, should not 
undermine economic, social and territorial cohesion, and should not distort 
competition. It has to comply with the Union‟s Treaties and law. However, 
acts adopted and decisions taken within enhanced cooperation unions shall 
not become part of the Union acquis (which new EU Member States must 
adopt upon accession); 
                                                        
9 We focus here on the general enhanced cooperation mechanism and refrain from 
discussing the special provisions for enhanced cooperation in the area of CFSP. 
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c. provisions referring to areas in which enhanced cooperation is simply 
forbidden. Enhanced cooperation should be established within the 
framework of the Union‟s non-exclusive competences, i.e. it cannot be 
established in areas where the Union has no powers or has exclusive 
powers (common policies); 
d. several provisions that deal with the protection of Member States not 
participating in the enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation must 
respect the competences, rights, and obligations of the outsiders. Acts 
adopted and decisions taken within enhanced cooperation unions are not 
binding to the outsiders, but EU Members wishing to join the enhanced 
cooperation at a later stage have to adopt the enhanced cooperation 
acquis. 
Secondly, there are some procedural provisions for enhanced cooperation: 
1. a participation threshold applies of nine Member States10; 
2. the enhanced cooperation scheme should be open at all times to all EU 
Member States, provided new participants adhere to the enhanced 
cooperation acquis; 
3. the Council grants authorization to proceed with enhanced cooperation by 
a European decision, upon a proposal from the Commission, and after 
obtaining the consent of European Parliament. The Council decides by 
qualified majority. 
Finally, the following provisions deal with decision-making within the 
enhanced cooperation union and its operation: 
a. the enhanced cooperation may make use of the Union‟s institutions; 
b. it is possible for the Member States engaged in enhanced cooperation to 
decide (unanimously) to take decisions by qualified majority even if in the 
specific area unanimity is the rule; 
c. all EU Member States are able to take part in deliberations, but only 
enhanced cooperation union members shall take part in the vote; 
d. expenditure resulting from enhanced cooperation (other than 
administrative costs) shall be borne by the insiders only; 
Both under the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty an important role is played 
by the European Commission.11 First, the Commission is to pass a request for 
enhanced cooperation to the Council by means of a Commission proposal. 
Secondly, the Commission vets any later applications of Member States 
wanting to join the sub-group. 
 
 
4. PROS AND CONS OF ENHANCED COOPERATION 
 
In the academic literature various pros and cons of differentiated integration, 
and more specifically of enhanced cooperation, have been put forward, 
though unfortunately not in very systematic way. 
We should compare enhanced cooperation with two other possibilities: 
a. unitary integration; 
b. alternative integration (outside the EU framework). 
 
                                                        
10 In this regard the Lisbon Treaty differs from the Constitutional Treaty which used a 
general threshold of one-third of the number of Member States. 
11 See Federal Trust (2005) for a discussion of the possible functioning of some other 
institutions under flexibility. 
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Table 2 lists some aspects that are relevant in comparing unitary integration, 
enhanced cooperation and alternative integration. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of uniform integration, enhanced cooperation and alternative 
integration 
 Uniform 
integration 
Enhanced cooperation Alternative 
integration 
1. Danger of 
distortion of 
competition, internal 
market 
infringements 
No Low Low 
2. Danger of 
decrease of cohesion 
No Middle Possibly high 
3. Transaction costs 
in general 
Relatively low Relatively low (if EU 
framework is used), 
relatively high (if EU 
framework is not used) 
Relatively high 
4. Procedural 
constraints 
High Middle (but mitigated if 
unanimity is replaced by 
majority decision-
making) 
Low 
5. Democratic 
(input) legitimacy  
High High Low 
6. Use in fields of 
non-EU-
competences 
Not possible Not possible Possible 
7. Position of 
outsiders 
No outsiders Relatively weak due to 
first-mover advantage 
 
Beneficiaries of path-
finding 
Relatively weak 
due to first-
mover 
advantage 
 
Beneficiaries of 
path-finding 
8. Involvement of 
third countries 
Not possible Not possible Possible 
 
 
One of the main possible disadvantages of flexibility in general, compared to 
unitary integration, is that it leads to less internal cohesion (in economic, 
social or territorial terms). In addition to this, often the danger of distortion of 
competition and of distortion of the functioning of the internal market is 
mentioned. Whether flexibility indeed endangers cohesion and the internal 
market is a matter of judgment. It could be argued that the substantive 
conditions for enhanced cooperation (see b. and c. in the previous section) 
are rather restrictive and that they explicitly address these dangers. Actually, 
a closer look at these conditions shows that these conditions are rather 
general and merely repeat general obligations also to be found elsewhere in 
the Treaties (Philippart & Sie Dhian Ho 2003, p. 15). In that sense, compared 
to the possibility of unitary integration, enhanced cooperation does not entail 
a disadvantage. Moreover, compared to alternative integration, the conditions 
referring to the internal market, to competition, to cohesion and to the 
exclusive powers of the Union, do not really constitute a disadvantage of 
enhanced cooperation as Member States are not allowed to infringe EU 
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Treaties in these respects as part of alternative integration schemes either. 
There is however the possibility that enhanced cooperation may lead to a 
permanent divide between insiders and outsiders, between a rich core and a 
poor periphery, which Martin & Ottaviano (1995) –in the context of possible 
enhanced cooperation in the field of company taxation- have labelled the 
“agglomeration effect of multi-speed integration”, which is increased if 
enhanced cooperation groups in different fields are stable (rather than mixed 
coalitions). As the decision to form such groups in the case of alternative 
integration is easier than in the case of enhanced cooperation, this danger is 
even greater in the case of alternative integration. 
 
As far the general transaction costs are concerned, these are high in the case 
of alternative integration, but can be low in the case of enhanced cooperation 
if the EU administrative framework is used (and in that case these 
administrative costs are borne by the EU-27). Such use is however not 
compulsory. 
 
Another issue is the extent to which procedural (decision-making) constraints 
play a part. Obviously, these are in principle high in the case of unitary 
integration thereby creating the possibility of decision-making and integration 
deadlock. With enhanced cooperation these procedural constraints are less 
strict and can even be reduced if the enhanced cooperation group members 
decide (unanimously) to switch from unanimity (if that is the relevant 
decision-making rule) to majority decision making. 
 
Related to this is the issue of democratic (input) legitimacy. The provisions on 
enhanced cooperation safeguard proper involvement of European Parliament 
and –in terms of deliberative democracy- of outsiders. This is clearly different 
from the case of alternative integration which is often fully intergovernmental, 
with limited involvement of (national) parliaments and no involvement of 
outsiders. 
 
Unitary integration and enhanced cooperation cannot deal with policy fields 
that are not in the realm of the EU. The prohibition of enhanced cooperation 
in fields where the Union has no powers clearly is a disadvantage of enhanced 
cooperation compared to alternative integration. 
 
The position of outsiders is a complicated one. Enhanced cooperation (and the 
same goes for alternative integration schemes) creates a partial acquis 
resulting in a first-mover advantage (Bordignon & Brusco 2003, Bordignon 
2005). On the one hand, such an advantage could be an incentive for hesitant 
Member States to participate in the enhanced cooperation from day one, or 
even to promote direct moves forward for the EU as a whole without actual 
enhanced cooperation taking place. In the latter case the existence of the 
mere possibility of enhanced cooperation mechanism can already break 
deadlock. As Philippart & Sie Dhian Ho (2003) argue, in a number of cases the 
“threat” of starting enhanced cooperation has probably contributed to break 
deadlock situations.12 On the other hand, the first-mover advantage could 
                                                        
12 They mention the unlocking (in 2000) of the deadlock on the regulation concerning 
the European Company Statute and the 2001 agreement on a European Arrest 
Warrant. In addition the Bolkestein Directive on services (2006) could be mentioned. 
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create rigidity at later stages. Although enhanced cooperation is open to all 
Member States at all stages, accession to the enhanced cooperation is 
restricted to those member States willing to accept the partial acquis created 
by the first movers. Contrarily, one could argue that outsiders profit from the 
path-finding efforts of the first movers. The enhanced cooperation group 
paves the way for the countries temporarily left behind. Another possibility is 
that enhanced cooperation in one field, by one group of countries, will extend 
to other areas and will thus benefit other countries. This possibility has been 
put forward by, among others, Baldwin (1q993) who uses the term “domino-
effect”, by Pisany-Ferry (1995) who talks of a “centripetal force” and by 
Gomes de Andrade (2005) who uses the term “pull effect”. 
 
Finally, alternative integration, compared to unitary integration and enhanced 
cooperation, offers the possibility to include third countries in the cooperation. 
 
 
5. PATENTS AND DIVORCE LAW 
 
 
5.1 Enhanced cooperation and the single community patent 
 
The issue 
Although there is the European Patent Organisation (EPO), there is no single 
EU patent, which is in sharp contrast with for example the United States of 
America and is regarded to put EU inventors and innovators at a significant 
competitive disadvantage. 
The EPO is an example of a parallel procedure (alternative integration). The 
EPO was preceded by the International Patent Institute (Institut International 
des Brevets, IIB), established in The Hague in 1947 by France and the three 
Benelux countries. Already in 1949 an international organization like the later 
EPO was advocated by the Council of Europe, modelled on the IIB. It would 
take until 1973 for the EPO to be established, by the Munich Convention (or: 
European Patent Convention). Currently, the EPO has 38 Member States, 
including all 27 EU Member States. 
The EPO provides a single patent grant procedure, not a single European 
patent. An EPO-patent can be obtained by filing a single application in one of 
the official languages of the European Patent Office (English, French or 
German) in a unitary procedure before the EPO and is valid in as many of the 
contracting states as the applicant cares to designate. An EPO-patent affords 
the same rights in the designated contracting states as a national patent 
granted in any of these states, but it is not a single, centrally enforceable, EU-
wide patent. This can be expensive for the patentee in that enforcement must 
be carried out through national courts in individual countries, and for a third 
party in that revocation cannot be accomplished centrally once a certain 
opposition period has expired. That is why, since the 1970s, there has been 
concurrent discussion towards the creation of a Community Patent (ComPat) 
in the European Union. The ComPat is intended to solve both of these 
problems, and also to provide a patent right that is consistent across Europe, 
thus fulfilling one of the key principles of the SEM (as different patent rights in 
different countries present a distortion of the internal market principle). 
Although initially political agreement was reached, the Luxembourg 
convention on the Community patent of 1975 never entered into force. 
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In August 2000 the Commission proposed a regulation for a Community 
patent. In May 2004, however, discussions within the EU led to a stalemate 
(the language issue being the most notable obstacle) and the prospect of a 
single EU-wide patent was receding. Even though the EPO-patent is far from 
perfect, there simply was no alternative available within the EU framework. 
Other legal agreements have been proposed –as with EPO: outside the EU 
legal framework- to reduce the costs of translation (of patents when granted) 
and litigation, namely the London Agreement (of 2000, signed by 10 
countries, of which 7 are EU Members, but still waiting to be ratified) and the 
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA, still under discussion). 
 
Enhanced cooperation 
After ten years of negotiations on the 2000 Commission proposal, in 
December 2010 it was concluded in the Competitiveness Council that 
unanimous agreement could not be reached on a joint approach of all Member 
States, as Spain and Italy strongly opposed the idea of using English, German 
and French as sole languages in patent granting. On 14 December 2010, the 
Commission, on request of twelve member States13, submitted a proposal for 
a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in this field. On 15 
February 2011 European Parliament gave its consent to the use of enhanced 
cooperation mechanism. The Council is expected to formally adopt the 
decision authorising enhanced cooperation in March 2011. Subsequently, the 
Commission will put forward two proposals, one establishing the single patent 
and another on the language regime. 
There are however indications that Spain and Italy will not let the case rest 
and may take the Commission and/or Council to the European Court of 
Justice. Their main argument is that the last-resort requirement is not fulfilled 
as it is not yet clear that the patent issue cannot be resolved by a joint 
approach.14 
 
 
5.2 Enhanced cooperation and divorce law 
 
The issue 
Currently, in cross-border divorce matters (which potentially affect 16 million 
married couples in the EU, i.e. 13% of total EU marriages), 20 Member States 
determine which country‟s law applies, based on factors such as nationality 
and long-term residence of the spouses. Seven Member States (Denmark, 
Latvia, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) always apply 
domestic law, regardless of the nationality or residential history of the 
spouses. This lack of harmonization of choice-of-law in divorce matters has 
resulted in a rush-to-court phenomenon, with husbands or wives in 
international marriages taking action in these courts where they feel they will 
get the best divorce settlement.15 
Following its 2005 Green Paper on Applicable Law and Jurisdiction in Divorce 
Matters (SEC(2005)331), the Commission in 2006 has proposed a Regulation 
(called Rome III) with aims at harmonizing choice-of-law rules in divorce 
                                                        
13 Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK.  
14 EUobserver, February 15, 2011. 
15 Also known as forum shopping or litigation shopping. 
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matters. Due to the opposition of a number of Member States, including 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, Rome III was 
never endorsed. These countries want to be able to keep applying there own 
–relatively liberal- divorce laws. 
 
Enhanced cooperation 
Over the summer of 2008 nine16 Member States have proposed then 
Commissioner Barrot to go ahead with harmonizing choice-of-law rules in 
divorce matters through the mechanism of enhanced cooperation. They 
argued that the draft legislation of Rome III had been stalled in the Council 
and that there was no other way to take it forward. In 2009 and 2010 other17 
Member States joined this request. Eventually, by 2010, 14 member States 
were backing the request for enhanced cooperation. 
Following the request, the Commission, on 24 March 2010, announced a new 
proposal, similar to Rome III, but to be adopted by a limited number of 
Member States only. Commissioner Reding indicated that although the 
optimal solution would be one that would include all 27 Member States, the 
new proposal should be seen as a desirable midway solution. On 16 June 
2010 European Parliament gave its consent for the enhanced cooperation 
measures. After political agreement was reached on 3-4 June 2010 (with a 
comfortable qualified majority), on 12 July 2010 the Council formally 
authorised the 14 Member States concerned to establish enhanced 
cooperation between themselves. On 3 December 2010 the justice ministers 
of these 14 Member States reached a political agreement on the actual 
legislation, which was approved by European Parliament on 15 December 
2010. The enhanced cooperation legislation will enter into force 18 months 
after its adoption. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Both cases clearly show the use of enhanced cooperation due to its main 
advantage: bypassing the constraints of unitary integration in terms of 
unanimous decision-making which has led to decades of integration deadlock. 
Moreover, in both cases the EU administrative framework is used and 
democratic (input) legitimacy has been safeguarded by the involvement of 
European Parliament. 
 
However, these first actual cases of enhanced cooperation also show the 
possible weaknesses of the mechanism. First, one could argue that the case 
of enhanced cooperation in patents shows that the introduction of enhanced 
cooperation has brought about the danger that unanimous decision-making 
has de facto been done away with in the few fields that it is still relevant in. 
After all, the unanimity requirement can be bypassed by establishing, with 
qualified majority, an enhanced cooperation. In that regard the possible 
involvement by Spain and Italy of the European Court of Justice to “vet” the 
                                                        
16 Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and 
Spain. In 2010 Greece withdrew its 2008 request. 
17 Belgium, France, Germany, Latvia, Malta and Portugal. The Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Greece are the outsiders. 
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enhanced cooperation decision regarding the patent system could be a first 
test to see if the mechanism really holds. 
Secondly, although it is too early to assess the risk of stable coalitions and 
agglomeration effects of enhanced cooperation, as we only have two cases of 
enhanced cooperation yet, it is interesting to see that in both cases France 
and Germany (being the most distinct advocates of a core Europe) are part of 
the enhanced cooperation groups. 
Thirdly, the case of patents shows that the (majority of the) Council, the 
Commission and European Parliament are not overcautious when it comes to 
application of the requirements on non-distortion of the internal market and 
competition. Enhanced cooperation in this field could lead to a split patent 
system, which is clearly at odds with the idea of common rules for a common 
market. On the other hand, it could be argued that having a split system is 
always better than having 27 different systems. 
Finally, the case of enhanced cooperation in divorce law shows that the 
concept of a vanguard group is a relative one. The countries that are engaged 
in enhanced cooperation in this field may be “path-breaking‟‟ as far the 
cooperation as such is concerned but not necessarily when it comes to the 
content of their divorce laws. Enhanced cooperation, through the first mover 
mechanism, can also be used to create a fait accompli in a specific policy field.  
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